The role of the neural reward circuitry in self-referential optimistic belief updates by Kuzmanovic, Bojana et al.
 
 
University of Birmingham
The role of the neural reward circuitry in self-
referential optimistic belief updates
Kuzmanovic, Bojana; Jefferson, Anneli; Vogeley, Kai
DOI:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.02.014
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND)
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Kuzmanovic, B, Jefferson, A & Vogeley, K 2016, 'The role of the neural reward circuitry in self-referential
optimistic belief updates', NeuroImage. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.02.014
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Checked for eligibility: 14/03/2016
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
  	

The role of the neural reward circuitry in self-referential optimistic belief
updates
Bojana Kuzmanovic, Anneli Jefferson, Kai Vogeley
PII: S1053-8119(16)00121-X
DOI: doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.02.014
Reference: YNIMG 12939
To appear in: NeuroImage
Received date: 14 August 2015
Accepted date: 8 February 2016
Please cite this article as: Kuzmanovic, Bojana, Jeﬀerson, Anneli, Vogeley, Kai, The role
of the neural reward circuitry in self-referential optimistic belief updates, NeuroImage
(2016), doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.02.014
This is a PDF ﬁle of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its ﬁnal form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could aﬀect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
1 
 
 
The role of the neural reward circuitry in self-referential optimistic belief updates 
Bojana Kuzmanovic
a,b,c
, Anneli Jefferson
d
, Kai Vogeley
c,e
 
 
a
 Max Planck Institute for Metabolism Research Cologne, Germany; 
b
 Research Center Juelich, Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine, Ethics in the 
Neurosciences (INM-8), Germany; 
c
 University Hospital Cologne, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Germany; 
d
 University of Birmingham, Department of Philosophy, UK; 
e 
Research Center Juelich, Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine,  
Cognitive Neuroscience (INM-3), Germany. 
 
Corresponding author: 
Bojana Kuzmanovic 
Mailing address: Max Planck Institute for Metabolism Research,  
Gleulerstr. 50, 50931 Cologne, Germany 
E-Mail: bojana.kuzmanovic@sf.mpg.de 
Phone: +49 221 4725-255 
Fax: +49 221 4725-344 
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
2 
 
Abstract 
People are motivated to adopt the most favorable beliefs about their future because 
positive beliefs are experienced as rewarding. However, it is so far inconclusive whether brain 
regions known to represent reward values are involved in the generation of optimistically 
biased belief updates. To address this question, we investigated neural correlates of belief 
updates that result in relatively better future outlooks, and therefore imply a positive 
subjective value of the judgment outcome. Participants estimated the probability of 
experiencing different adverse future events. After being provided with population base rates 
of these events, they had the opportunity to update their initial estimates. Participants made 
judgments concerning themselves or a similar other, and were confronted with desirable or 
undesirable base rates (i.e. lower or higher than their initial estimates). 
Belief updates were smaller following undesirable than desirable information, and this 
optimism bias was stronger for judgments regarding oneself than others. During updating, the 
positive value of self-related updates was reflected by neural activity in the subgenual 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that increased both with increasing sizes of favorable 
updates, and with decreasing sizes of unfavorable updates. During the processing of self-
related undesirable base rates, increasing activity in a network including the dorsomedial 
PFC, hippocampus, thalamus and ventral striatum predicted decreasing update sizes. 
Thus, key regions of the neural reward circuitry contributed to the generation of 
optimistically biased self-referential belief updates. While the vmPFC tracked subjective 
values of belief updates, a network including the ventral striatum was involved in neglecting 
information calling for unfavorable updates. 
 
Keywords: belief update; optimism bias; reward; subjective value; subgenual vmPFC. 
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1 Introduction 
Thinking about the future is part of a person‟s identity and supports action planning, 
decision-making and emotion regulation (Carver and Scheier, 2014; D'Argembeau et al., 
2012; D'Argembeau et al., 2009). However, this highly influential prospective thinking does 
not provide us with the most realistic future outlook, but is instead prevalently optimistically 
biased. Cross-culturally and independently of gender and age, people tend to overestimate the 
likelihood of positive future outcomes, and to underestimate the likelihood of negative ones in 
various domains of daily life, including health-related issues, social relations, and professional 
success (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Leary, 2007; Sharot et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2011; 
Shepperd et al., 2002; Shepperd et al., 2013; Weinstein and Klein, 1996). The consequences 
of optimistically distorted judgments can be positive or negative: Overestimated chances of 
success may lead to positive feelings and an increase of effort with beneficial effects for the 
individual and its environment, but may also lead to miscalculations and failures. 
It has been assumed that both motivational and cognitive factors contribute to the 
optimistic bias, and this reciprocal influence has also been more generally described as 
“motivated cognition” (Hughes and Zaki, 2015). Cognitive explanations focus on how people 
achieve desired end states of judgments, and refer to selective memory search and conclusions 
that are biased toward retrieving confirmatory information for rewarding beliefs (Shepperd et 
al., 2002). Motivational explanations, on the other hand, relate to the pleasure of having 
favorable beliefs regarding oneself and one‟s own future, and the resulting desire to adopt 
such optimistic beliefs (Shepperd et al., 2002). Accordingly, optimism bias has been 
described as “a motivation to adopt the most rewarding (or least aversive) perspective on 
future outcomes” (Sharot et al., 2011).  
However, previous neuroimaging research on optimism bias reported solely the 
recruitment of brain regions related to complex cognitive processing, i.e. the inferior and 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (Sharot et al., 2011). Thus, there is still a lack of evidence for 
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the motivational explanations, which would require a demonstration of recruitment of key 
structures of the neural reward circuit. While this complex network includes several cortical 
and subcortical regions, the most prominent structures involved in human value processing 
are the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the ventral striatum (vStr) (Bartra et al., 
2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014; Haber and Knutson, 2010; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; 
Peters and Buchel, 2010). The vmPFC, and particularly its subgenual part, has robustly been 
shown to play a critical role in representing the positive subjective value of rewards and 
emotional stimuli (Chase et al., 2015; Levy and Glimcher, 2012). While the vStr has 
traditionally been related to learning from errors in reward prediction, more recent research 
supports an integrative view involving both learning and motivational functions (Bartra et al., 
2013; Hamid et al., 2016). More specifically, dopaminergic signaling in vStr has been shown 
to represent values of estimated future rewards, which influence decisions whether to invest 
effort in actions aiming at these reward states (Hamid et al., 2016). 
The aim of the present study was to demonstrate that favorable beliefs recruit the same 
brain regions known to be associated with external rewards, to support the view that they have 
internal positive subjective values able to guide judgment and decision processes. We 
employed a revised version of an fMRI belief update paradigm. The paradigm assesses how 
people update their initial beliefs about risks of experiencing hazards when they are provided 
with base rates for these hazards that result in estimation errors (i.e., the difference between 
subject's first risk estimation and the presented base rates). It could be shown that updating 
was optimistically biased because it was larger after desirable new information (lower risk 
than initially expected) than after undesirable information (higher risk than initially expected) 
(Sharot et al., 2011). These results contradict formal learning principles as these predict 
balanced updating in response to errors, independent of the desirability of the new 
information.  
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The first revision was to extend the study design in order to differentiate between 
judgments referring to oneself and others. Second, in order to increase the experimental 
control and precision, we systematically manipulated the presented base rates, and included 
both the first and the second estimation (before and after the presentation of the base rate) in 
one single trial. And third, we modified the analyses to allow the identification of neural 
regions that track fluctuations of updates on a trial-by-trial level (in contrast to tracking 
estimation errors as in Sharot et al., 2011), because belief updates represent the end state of 
the judgment process and are expected to have a specific subjective value for judging persons.  
We hypothesized that the vmPFC would reflect the differential subjective value of 
varying update sizes that result in better or worse future outlooks relative to participants‟ 
initial beliefs, particularly for self-referential judgments. The larger an update towards an 
unexpectedly low average risk, the better is the subject‟s adjusted future outlook. Thus, 
increasing updates after favorable new information are expected to have increasing positive 
value and to be accompanied by an increasing vmPFC activity. In contrast, the greater an 
update towards an unexpectedly high average risk, the worse is the updated subject‟s future 
outlook, so that decreasing updates in this condition are expected to result in an increasing 
positive value and increasing vmPFC activity. 
Furthermore, we explored in which brain regions the activity during the reception of 
the new information (base rates) predicted subsequent updates. The belief reconstruction 
initiated at this point may encompass cognitive processes such as memory retrieval or 
inferences, but may also be modulated by the motivation to adopt the most favorable 
conclusions (Shepperd et al., 2002), particularly when these are self-relevant and unfavorable 
(Sharot et al., 2011). Finally, we explored the relationships between the optimism bias in 
belief updating and trait optimism. 
2 Material and Methods 
2.1 Participants 
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A total of 36 right-handed individuals with no reported history of neurological or 
psychiatric illness were recruited online within the Research Center Juelich, Germany, and 
participated in the fMRI study. Twelve persons were excluded from analyses. Five persons 
had excessive head movements [outliers were selected by total movement greater than 3mm 
or scan-to-scan motion greater than 1.5 mm, as assessed by ArtRepair Software (Mazaika et 
al., 2005)], probably due to a relatively tight head coil used in the study; the logfiles of one 
person were overwritten; one person suspected that the base rates were not correct; two 
persons had insufficient German language skills as they did not know the meaning of a high 
number of stimulus events (18 and 24 events). The remaining three persons had a mean 
positive estimation error of less than 7, because of frequent low fist estimates (see S.1). Thus, 
data from 24 participants were included in the analyses (mean age = 25.13 years, SD = 3.89, 
ranging from 19 to 38; 13 females). All participants were naïve with respect to the specific 
purpose of the study, gave written informed consent and were paid for their participation. The 
study was approved by the local ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of 
Cologne, Germany. 
2.2 Stimulus Material 
We used 88 short German descriptions of adverse life events as stimuli and included a 
wide range of events relating to different life domains (e.g., dementia, arthritis, 
unemployment, or pest infestation in the home, see Kuzmanovic et al., 2015 for the complete 
list). The assignment of the stimuli to the experimental conditions and the order of trials were 
randomized anew for each participant. Note that by applying a random assignment of the 
stimuli to the experimental conditions, event characteristics that have been suggested to 
modulate the optimism bias (e.g., base rate, event valence, arousal, controllability, personal 
experience) (Rose et al., 2008; Sharot et al., 2007; Weinstein, 1980, 1987), or general 
stimulus characteristics (e.g., number of words or letters) were equally distributed across the 
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experimental conditions, and thus do not constitute confounding variables (see also 
Kuzmanovic et al., 2015). 
2.3 Design and Procedure 
In each trial of the update experiment, participants first had to estimate the probability 
that different adverse events would occur at least once in a lifetime. Next, they were presented 
with a corresponding base rate for the general population, and were then given the 
opportunity to adjust their initial estimate (see Figure 1 for illustration and durations of 
events). The intervals within the trial (“jitter 4 s” in Figure 1) and between the trials randomly 
varied, resulting in mean durations of 4000ms and 6000ms, respectively (within-trial 
durations varied between 2875ms and 5125ms, between-trial durations between 4875ms and 
7125ms). The successive arrangement of i) the first estimation, ii) the presentation of the base 
rate and iii) the second estimation (including the display of the initial estimate) within one 
trial represent a substantial modification of the original paradigm (Sharot et al., 2011) and 
served the purpose of minimizing confounding memory effects. 
Figure 1 Example trials of the update experiment. 
At the beginning of each trial the target person of the judgment was indicated, i.e., self or other. Next, 
an adverse event was displayed and the participants had to estimate the probability of experiencing it 
at least once in their (or other‟s) lifetime. Then, the base rate of the respective event in the general 
population was presented. Finally, participants had the opportunity to update their initial estimate. 
Unbeknownst to participants, the valence of the presented base rate was experimentally manipulated 
by subtracting or adding varying values from participant‟s first estimate. Upper row: An example of a 
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desirable (i.e., positive) base rate that was generated by subtracting 10 from the first estimate given. 
Lower row: An equivalent example of an undesirable (i.e., negative) base rate that was generated by 
adding 10 to the first estimate given. The exact time course of the trials is shown at the bottom. 
 
The factors that were expected to affect the update behavior within the task were the 
target person of the judgment (self, other), the valence of the new information (positive, 
negative), and participants‟ trait optimism scoring (high, low). In contrast to the original 
paradigm that included self-related judgments only (Sharot et al., 2011), the target person to 
whom the probabilities had to be ascribed was manipulated by instructing participants to 
make estimations for themselves in half of the trials (self), or for a similar other person of the 
same age, sex and socioeconomic background in the other half of the trials (other). The 
valence of the new information referring to base rates of adverse events depended on 
participant‟s initial rating in each trial: When the base rate for an adverse event was lower 
than participants‟ first estimate, then this constituted desirable or positive (p) information; 
when it was higher than the first estimate, then this constituted undesirable or negative (n) 
information. Participants‟ trait optimism was measured by the Life Orientation Test (LOT-R, 
Glaesmer et al., 2008). The LOT-R median of the whole sample was used to generate two 
subsamples (median = 17; see Table 2): low trait optimism (low_to, n = 13) and high 
trait optimism subsample (high_to, n = 11). Thus, a 2-by-2-by-2 design was realized with 
the factors target (self vs. other) and valence (p vs. n), resulting in four within-subject 
conditions self_p, self_n, other_p and other_n, and the between-subject factor group (low_to 
vs. high_to). 
Participants were told that the experiment aims to investigate the neural substrates of 
expectations towards future life events. They were instructed that there was no right or wrong 
answer as we were interested in their subjective judgment, and to feel free to update their first 
estimate as much as they wanted. They were also informed that the population base rates were 
determined by the German Federal Statistical Office (“Statistisches Bundesamt”), and that 
they should consider this information during their second estimation. 
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Unbeknownst to participants, the base rates were in fact systematically manipulated in 
order to control for frequencies and distributions of positive and negative trials, which was the 
third modification of the original paradigm (Sharot et al., 2011). Positive and negative base 
rates were computed by subtracting or adding varying values from the first estimate (ranging 
from 1 to 25; see Figure 1 for an example; see S.1 for more details). In a final debriefing, 
participants were informed that they had been deceived about the source of population base 
rates, and the methodological reasons for this procedure were explained.   
In addition, participants were instructed to abstain from responding to events for 
which they felt unable to make a proper estimation. For instance, this could apply to events 
that participants were experiencing at the time of participation (e.g., currently suffering from 
hay fever), or that they had never heard about (e.g., unfamiliar diseases). 
Responses were given by selecting an absolute probability number with a possible 
range from 1% to 99% in a completely continuous manner by using three response buttons. 
Participants always used both hands, in one session the right hand for selecting the percentage 
number and the left hand for confirming it, and in the other session the other way around 
(order counter-balanced across participants). The number currently displayed on the screen 
could be decreased by pressing the left button (e.g., index finger of the right hand), and 
increased by pressing the right button (e.g., middle finger of the right hand). As soon as the 
desired number appeared, participants could give a final confirmation of their response by 
pressing the confirmation button (little finger of the other hand). For all first estimations, the 
number initially displayed was 50%, and for all second estimations the number corresponded 
to the selected first estimate (see Figure 1). Participants were instructed to answer within six 
seconds. If the answer was not recorded within this time, a second and last response period of 
six seconds was presented. In the event that the first estimate was not provided, the rest of the 
trial was omitted. Mean durations of the two task sessions were 22.46 min (SD = 1.43) and 
21.83 min (SD = 1.16), respectively. 
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After the fMRI acquisition, participants completed a short debriefing including ratings 
of task difficulty, and had the opportunity to describe problems or hypotheses regarding the 
purpose of the task. Importantly, because we manipulated the base rates, we took great care to 
assess participants‟ suspicions regarding their plausibility by using the funnel debriefing 
method (for more details see Kuzmanovic et al., 2015). Furthermore, they rated their personal 
experience for each stimulus event that they had seen in the update experiment on a 7-point-
scale (from 1 = unfamiliar to 7 = currently experiencing). The personal experience ratings 
were carried out on a laptop with the software Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., 
Version 15.1). Prior to both the update experiment and the personal experience ratings, 
participants underwent a standardized, computerized instruction including practice trials with 
stimuli not used within the experimental tasks. Finally, self-report questionnaires (German 
versions) were completed to measure relevant characteristics of the sample: LOT-R assessing 
trait optimism on a scale from 0 (pessimistic) to 24 (optimistic), and Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI, Beck and Steer, 1987) assessing symptoms of depression on a scale from 0 
(minimal) to 63 (maximal). 
The MRI data were acquired by using a Magnetom Trio 3T whole body scanner and a 
32-channel head coil (Siemens AG, Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany). fMRI data 
during the update experiment were acquired in two sessions with a T2*-weighted gradient 
echo planar imaging sequence [TR = 2200 ms, TE = 30 ms, field of view = 210 × 210 mm
2
, 
voxel size = 3 × 3 × 3 mm
3
, 33 oblique (maximal 30°) axial slices]. Three additional volumes 
were collected and discarded at the beginning of each session to allow for magnetic 
saturation. In addition, we acquired high-resolution T1- weighted MPRAGE images (TR = 
2250 ms, TE = 3.93 ms, field of view = 256 × 256 mm
2
, voxel size = 1 × 1 × 1 mm
3
, 128 
sagittal images), as well as DTI images (related analyses not reported here). Stimuli and 
response displays were presented and recorded by the software package Presentation 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Version 15.1), and projected onto a screen at the end of the 
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magnet bore that participants viewed via a mirror mounted on the head coil. Responses were 
assessed using a MR-compatible LUMItouch keypad (Photon Control Inc., Burnaby, BC, 
Canada). 
2.4 Measures 
The critical measure of participants‟ behavior was the size of updates after being 
confronted with base rates of future life events. For each participant, the difference between 
the first and the second estimate was computed in each of the 88 trials, and then mean updates 
were computed separately for each of the four experimental conditions (self_p, self_n, 
other_p and other_n) by averaging all trial-based updates within each condition. Thus, every 
participant ended up with four repeated-measures of mean updates. If present, trials with 
missing responses (M = 1.38, SD = 2.00) and trials with estimation error of zero (M = 3.38, 
SD = 4.20; e.g., when the participant‟s first estimate was 1%, no errors can be generated to 
provide desirable base rates, i.e., rates lower than the first estimate; see S.1 for more details) 
were excluded before computing the mean updates. We used signed update values, but with a 
differential procedure for lower (positive) and higher (negative) base rates. In conditions 
self_p and other_p, updates in each trial were computed as first estimate minus second 
estimate, because the presented base rate was lower than the first estimate and second 
estimates were expected to be adjusted to this smaller value. Conversely, in conditions self_n 
and other_n, updates were computed as second estimate minus first estimate. Thus, in the 
majority of trials independent of condition, updates were equal to or greater than zero (see 
also Table 1 and Figure 2 for mean values; mean number of zero updates = 20.29, SD = 
10.34). For trials in which participants responded in an unexpected direction (e.g., first 
estimate = 20%, base rate = 10%, second estimate = 25%), update was a negative value (M = 
1.63, SD = 1.69). 
Additionally, in order to obtain inter-individual measures of the optimism bias, we 
computed the difference between the mean update for positive and negative trials, separately 
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for self and other, for each participant. The self-specific optimism bias (biasself) was computed 
as mean updateself_p – mean updateself_n, and the other-related optimism bias (biasother) was 
computed as mean updateother_p – mean updateother_n. Positive values indicate an optimism bias 
as they result from larger mean updates after desirable than undesirable new information. 
Finally, a differential optimism bias (biasself_other) was computed as biasself – biasother. Here, a 
positive value indicates a greater self-related than other-related optimism bias. In addition, we 
computed the difference between the mean first estimates (1
st
E) relating to self and other 
(1
st
Eself_other): mean 1
st
Eself – mean 1
st
Eother. The difference in initial risk estimates for adverse 
future events represents a classical measure for the „comparative optimism‟ beyond update 
paradigms (Shepperd et al., 2002). These bias measures, biasself, biasother, biasself_other, and 
1
st
Eself_other were used to test for correlations with self-report questionnaire scores. 
2.5 Statistical Analyses 
2.5.1 Behavioral data. All behavioral analyses were conducted by using IBM SPSS 
Statistics (version 2.0). In order to test for an optimism bias in belief updating under 
consideration of participants‟ trait optimism, we conducted a mixed ANOVA with two 
within-subject factors target (self vs. other) and valence (positive vs. negative), one between-
subject factor trait optimism (low_to vs. high_to), and the dependent variable mean update 
(general linear model, repeated-measures design). In addition, in order to better characterize 
the effect of trait optimism, two repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted with target and 
valence as within-subject factors, separately for the two groups of participants with low and 
high trait optimism, respectively. Pearson‟s correlation coefficient, r, was used as an effect 
size measure (all F-values had 1 degree of freedom). 
In order to test for relationships between the individual measures of the optimism bias 
(biasself, biasother, biasself_other, 1
st
Eself_other), trait optimism (LOT-R) and depression symptoms 
(BDI), Pearson‟s correlation coefficients (r) were calculated. We expected that biasself, 
biasself_other and 1
st
Eself_other would relate positively to each other and to LOT-R, and negatively 
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to BDI corresponding to reduced optimism in depression (Korn et al., 2014; Scheier et al., 
1994; Strunk and Adler, 2009; Strunk et al., 2006), thus one-tailed tests were applied. We did 
not have any hypotheses about the relationship between biasother and these scores, so we 
applied two-tailed tests here. The alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. 
2.5.2 FMRI data. FMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using MATLAB 7.9 
(The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, USA) and Statistical Parametric Mapping software 
package (SPM8, Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging, London, UK). The EPI images 
were corrected for head movements using realignment and unwarping, normalized to the 
Montreal Neurological Institute reference space using the unified segmentation function, 
resampled to 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm voxels, and spatially smoothed with an 8 mm full width 
at half maximum Gaussian kernel. 
Two separate analyses were conducted: i) a linear parametric modulation of the neural 
activity during the 2
nd
 estimation by update, and, ii) a linear parametric modulation of the 
neural activity during the presentation of base rates by update (see S.6 for an illustration and 
more details). The first analysis aimed to identify brain regions where the activity during 
belief updating correlated with the size of the update, and the second analysis explored 
whether there were brain regions, in which the activity during the confrontation with 
disconfirming new information correlated with – and thus predicted – subsequent update 
sizes.  
At the single-subject level, conditions were modeled using a boxcar reference vector 
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function and its time derivative. Events 
relating to first estimation (duration 3 s, including target instruction), base rates (duration 2 s) 
and second estimation (duration 2 s) were separately modeled for the different experimental 
conditions (see Figure 1 and Figure S.1). Button presses indicating the first and the second 
estimate were modeled on separate regressors (duration from the onset of the response event 
to the last button press). Trials with missing responses, and trials with estimation error of 
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zero, if present, were modeled on a separate regressor. Movement parameters were included 
as multiple regressors of no interest. Low-frequency signal drifts were filtered using a cutoff 
of 128 s. Fourteen contrast images were computed relative to the implicit baseline (i.e., 
weighting a single regressor of interest with 1 in both sessions and the rest of regressors with 
0) and used for group-level models: 1
st
 estimation: self and other; base rate: self_p, self_n, 
other_p, other_n; 2
nd
 estimation: self_p, self_p_PM (PM, parametric modulation by update) 
self_n, self_n_PM, other_p, other_p_PM, other_n, other_n_PM. In the second analysis 
applying PM to the average BOLD response to base rates, PM-contrasts referred to base rate 
presentations and not to 2
nd
 estimations (see Figure S.1). 
At the group level, for each of two abovementioned analyses, a flexible factorial 
design with factors „condition‟ and „subject‟ was conducted. The threshold for significance 
was set to p < .05, familywise error (FWE) -corrected at the voxel level for the whole brain 
with an extent threshold of 10 voxels. Because the main interest concerned neural correlates 
of varying update sizes, we report all significant results relating to whole brain parametric 
modulation effects from both analyses. In order to explore whether there are differences in the 
BOLD response pattern between the low_to and the high_to participants, beta values were 
extracted for all significant cluster maxima and compared between the subsamples using a t-
test (p < .05, not corrected for multiple comparisons). For completeness, we also report whole 
brain main effects relating to average BOLD responses, i.e., independent of parametric 
modulation by update (see S.7). Furthermore, we also report and briefly discuss behavioral 
and neural results relating to estimation errors (see S.4, S.8, S.10). Activations were displayed 
on sections of the mean normalized T1 image of the overall sample. Anatomical labels were 
assigned using the Anatomy toolbox (Amunts et al., 2007; Eickhoff et al., 2005). 
3 Results 
3.1 Behavioral Data 
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3.1.1 Differential updating dependent on target, valence and trait optimism. The 
behavioral results of the mixed ANOVA show that there was a significant interaction between 
target and valence: Participants updated less in response to undesirable than to desirable base 
rates, and this effect was stronger for self-related than for other-related judgments (see Table 
1 and Figure 2A). However, there was a significant three-way interaction indicating that the 
groups with low and high trait optimism demonstrated different update behavior patterns. The 
additional two ANOVAs (separately conducted for the low_to and high_to subsamples) 
revealed that the target × valence interaction was significant only in the high_to group, but not 
in the low_to group (see Table 1 and Figure 2B). Thus, only the group with high trait 
optimism showed a significant self-specific optimism bias. The pattern of the update behavior 
in the high_to group can also be described as a selectively decreased update behavior during 
self_n [self_n vs. self_p see Table 1; ps < .01 for self_n vs. other_p and self_n vs. other_n], 
relative to all other conditions with a comparably high update level (all ps > .05 for self_p vs. 
other_p, self_p vs. other_n, and other_p vs. other_n). 
Figure 2 Behavioral results of the belief update experiment.  
A) The overall sample shows the expected interaction between target person and valence of base rates: 
Participants generally tended to update less after undesirable (negative) new information, and this 
tendency was greater for self-related than for other-related judgments indicating an optimism bias.  
B) High and low scorings on trait optimism were associated with a differential pattern of the update 
behavior. The self-protective optimism bias was strongly pronounced in participants scoring high on 
trait optimism (right), but absent in participants scoring low on trait optimism (left). Error bars show 
95% C.I. * p < .05. 
 
The reported ANOVA results could be replicated when using update values 
standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 within each subject taking into 
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account inter-individual differences in the mean tendency to update initial estimates (group × 
target × valence interaction: p = .001; see S.4 for more details). In addition, confirming the 
differential updating pattern between subsamples scoring high and low on trait optimism, an 
ANCOVA based on the overall sample and including target person and valence as within-
subject factors and LOT-R scores as a covariate revealed a significant three-way interaction 
target × valence × LOT-R, F(1,22) = 5.75, p = .025. 
Other task-related variables, including first and second estimates, base rates and 
estimation errors differed significantly across the four conditions [Fs(3,69) > 16, ps < .001], 
which was partly forced by the experimental design (for descriptive statistics and detailed 
explanations see S.3 and S.1). For instance, it is to be expected that base rates in the positive 
condition are lower than in the negative condition because they were generated by subtracting 
values from participants‟ first estimates, while negative base rates were computed by adding 
values to first estimates. Importantly, however, none of these variables had a significant 
relationship to update sizes (first estimate, r = .12, p = .229; second estimate, r = -.01, p = 
.998; base rate, r = -.19, p = .066; estimation error, r = -.15, p = .159; not corrected for 
multiple comparisons), and the ANOVA effects of target person, valence and trait optimism 
on update remained significant even after controlling for these variables (ps < .05; see S.5 for 
more details). 
3.1.2 Relationships between bias measures and questionnaire scores. The individual 
bias values as well as the trait optimism and BDI scores are presented in Table 2. The 
correlation analysis revealed that both biasself and biasself_other were positively related to trait 
optimism (biasself: r = .35, p = .046; biasself_other: r = .46, p = .013), and inversely related to 
depression symptoms (biasself: r = -.42, p = .020; biasself_other: r = -.50, p = .007). There was no 
significant correlation between biasother and trait optimism (r = -.15, p = .475) or depression 
symptoms (r = .12, p = .574). In addition, 1
st
Eself_other did not correlate with trait optimism (r = 
.03, p = .447), depression symptoms (r = -.04, p = .436), nor biasother (r = .10, p = .656). 
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However, there was a correlation between 1
st
Eself_other and biasself (r = -.36, p = .042), and 
1
st
Eself_other and biasself_other (r = -.42, p = .021). Furthermore, there was a strong inverse 
correlation between the trait optimism and depression symptoms (r = -.67, p = .000). 
3.1.3 Post-experimental assessments. The analysis of the ratings of personal 
experience with stimulus events revealed that the stimulus events were equally familiar within 
the four experimental conditions [F (3,69) = 1.76, p = .163; overall: M = 3.00, SD = 0.36], 
and that participants indeed followed the instruction not to respond to events that they were 
experiencing at the time of the experiment. The examination of the short post-experiment 
debriefing revealed that the task was not too difficult, and that none of the participants who 
were included in the analyses were aware of the task purpose, namely, investigating the 
optimism bias as indicated by larger updates after desirable than after undesirable new 
information, in particular for self-related judgments. Participants reported that some base rates 
appeared surprisingly low or high, but that they attributed this to the fact that the probabilities 
related to the whole population and to the entire lifetime. None of the participants included in 
the analyses doubted the authenticity of the base rates. In fact, even after being informed 
about the task purpose and the manipulation of the base rates at the end of the experiment, 
none of the included participants declared that they were aware of either of these. 
3.2 FMRI data 
FMRI analyses aimed to identify brain regions in which the activity correlated with 
the size of updates on a trial-by-trial level, i.e., targeting within-subject effects. For the 
complete list of results relating to the parametric modulation by updates see Table 3. 
3.2.1 Neural correlates of updates during second estimation. There was a significant 
difference between regression slopes for self_p and self_n in the vmPFC. The beta estimates 
in the Figure 3 show that the correlation was positive for self_p, but negative for self_n. That 
means that when making self-referential judgments, the activity in the vmPFC was greater the 
larger the desirable updates, and it was also greater the smaller the undesirable updates. This 
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effect also remained significant when conducting a paired t-test at the second level of analysis 
directly comparing the parametric regressors relating to self_p and self_n, respectively (T = 
4.33, puncorr = .001, peak at 0/ 34/ -14, cluster size 36), however at a less stringent significance 
threshold. In addition, when repeating the same analysis, but with within-subject standardized 
update values instead of row update values, the self_p > self_n effect in the vmPFC was 
replicated (T = 5.51, pFWE-corr = .003, peak at -2/ 36/ -10, cluster size 50). 
 
Figure 3 Activity in the subgenual ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) during self-related belief 
updating reflected the subjective value of belief updates. 
The direct comparison between self-trials with positive and negative base rates revealed a differential 
within-subject correlation between the activity in the vmPFC and the size of belief updates. After 
positive base rates (self_p) there was a positive correlation between the BOLD response and the size 
of updates: The larger the updates, the stronger the BOLD response. Conversely, after negative base 
rates (self_n) there was an inverse correlation between the BOLD response and the size of updates: 
The smaller the update, the stronger the BOLD response. This activation pattern reflects the subjective 
value of updating: Both large updates leading to an improvement of future outlooks relative to the 
initial belief, and small updates (or refraining from updating) towards worse future outlooks are 
expected to have a positive subjective value, and were accompanied by an increased BOLD response 
in the vmPFC. Error bars show 90% C.I. 
 
No comparable effect was present for other-related judgments (other_p > other_n). 
Moreover, the interaction effect [(self_p > self_n) > (other_p > other_n)] yielded a large 
activation in the vmPFC (maximum peak at 14/ 42/ -4, T = 5.17, size = 1621 voxels), 
including a peak at -6/ 34/ -6 (T = 3.95), however at a more liberal threshold (pFWE-corrs < .05 
at the cluster level, with p < .001 at the voxel level). This interaction confirms that the 
difference in regression slopes for positive and negative base rates was indeed specific for 
self-related judgments. 
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3.2.2 Neural correlates of updates during base rate presentation. In self-trials with 
undesirable base rates (self_n), there was an inverse correlation between the BOLD response 
to base rates and updates in a network including the thalamus, the fusiform gyrus extending 
into the hippocampus, occipital areas, vStr and the dmPFC (see Table 3B and Figure 4). Thus, 
during the reception of undesirable self-related base rates, the activity in these regions was 
greater the lower the size of subsequent updates. 
 
Figure 4 Neural activity during the presentation of self-related base rates that correlated with the size 
of subsequent updates on the trial-by-trial level. 
There was an inverse correlation between the BOLD response to base rates and the subsequent updates 
only after self-related negative base rates (self_n). The greater recruitment of the network including 
the thalamus (Th), the fusiform gyrus extending into the hippocampus (Hipp), the primary visual 
cortex (V1), the ventral striatum (vStr) and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), the smaller the 
subsequent belief updates resulting in an undesirable future outlook. 
 
The reported self_n effect also remained significant in the majority of identified 
regions when conducting a one sample t-test at the second level of analysis including the 
parametric regressor relating to self_n (dmPFC, thalamus, lingual gyrus, vStr; puncorrs > .002, 
Ts > 3.3), however at a less stringent significance threshold. In addition, when repeating the 
same analysis, but with within-subject standardized update values instead of raw update 
values, we could replicate the inverse correlation effect for self_n in all regions listed in Table 
3B except for the dmPFC (pFWE-corrs < .022). 
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No comparable effect was present for other-related judgments (other_n, inverse 
correlation). Moreover, the direct comparison (other_n > self_n) yielded the same network as 
the inverse self_n contrast alone, however at a more liberal threshold (puncorrs < .001, Ts > 
3.7). This comparison indicates that the increasing activation of the described network with 
decreasing subsequent updates during the processing of negative base rates was indeed 
specific for self-related judgments. 
3.2.3. Control variables. In order to examine whether the update-related effects might 
be related to the size of presented base rates, or to the size of estimation errors, we computed 
supplementary analyses with parametric modulation by base rates and estimation errors, 
respectively, instead of updates (see Tables S.4 and S.5). Relative to the main results of 
parametric modulation by updates reported in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, these analyses revealed no 
similarities or overlaps, indicating that the update-related effects cannot be accounted for by 
the influence of the base rates or estimation errors. 
Moreover, because of the correlation between updates and estimation errors (see Table 
S.1), we examined more closely whether the differential BOLD signals reported in 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2 were better accounted for by updates than by estimation errors. For each phase of the 
trial (second estimation and base rate presentation), we computed two separate first level 
models (Wood et al., 2008). One model included updates as parametric modulators, and the 
other model included estimation errors as parametric modulators. In order to scale the 
estimated regression parameters uniformly, the parameters representing estimation errors and 
updates were standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (Wood et al., 2008). 
Note that we did not include updates and estimation errors simultaneously into one model 
because of high correlations between these two variables. The resulting multicollinearity 
would have compromised the estimation of model parameters and the interpretability of 
separate parametric modulators (Wood et al., 2008). 
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At the second level of the comparative analysis relating to second estimation, a 
flexible factorial model with two regressors relating to parametric modulation of self_p and 
self_n by updates, and with two regressors relating to parametric modulation of self_p and 
self_n by estimation errors were computed, and the vmPFC cluster from Table 3A was used 
as search volume. In accordance with the finding that only update but not estimation error was 
a significant predictor of the differential activity in the vmPFC, the interaction effect 
[(self_pupdate > self_nupdate) > (self_pestimation error > self_nestimation error)] revealed that the effect of 
updates on differential activity in the vmPFC was significantly stronger than the one of 
estimation errors (T = 2.77, pFWE-corr = .030, peak at -6/ 38/ -8, cluster size 34). 
At the second level of the comparative analysis relating to base rate presentation, a 
flexible factorial model with two regressors relating to parametric modulation of self_n by 
updates and estimation errors, respectively, was computed and the significant clusters from 
Table 3B (inverse contrast self_n) were used as search volume. In accordance with the finding 
that only update but not estimation error was a significant predictor of the activity in the 
respective areas, the comparison self_nupdate < self_nestimation error revealed that the effect of 
updates was significantly stronger than the one of estimation errors in the lingual gyrus (T = 
4.53, pFWE-corr = .002, peak at -22/ -68/ -6, cluster size 22), and the vStr (T = 4.25, pFWE-corr = 
.004, peak at 14/ 8/ -4, cluster size 13). For the thalamus, the parahippocampal gyrus, and the 
dmPFC the difference was significant only at a threshold not corrected for multiple 
comparisons (puncorrs < .05, Ts > 1.96). 
Note that as we used the results reported in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 as search volumes, the 
comparative analyses at the second level are biased in favor of analyses based on updates. 
Importantly, however, the comparative analyses were not conducted to examine whether 
updates or estimation errors can generally better account for the data, but to show that the 
update-dependent activation patterns are indeed significantly better accounted for by updates 
than by estimation errors. 
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3.2.4 Differential neural correlates of updates dependent on trait optimism. 
Comparisons of the BOLD response patterns in all reported local maxima between 
subsamples with low and high trait optimism revealed only one significant difference, relating 
to the activity in the Rolandic operculum extending into the insula that exhibited an inverse 
correlation with updates (see Table 3, self_p, inverse correlation). 
4 Discussion 
The overall behavioral data corroborate prior findings of decreased updating in 
response to undesirable new information, and indicate that this effect is stronger for 
judgments referring to oneself than to others (Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Sharot et al., 2011). 
The interaction effect reflecting the particularly strong optimism bias for self-referential 
judgments was also significant when using standardized update values, which control for 
inter-individual differences in the general tendency to update initial estimates. Moreover, the 
self-specific optimism bias in updates was independent of the size of first and second 
estimates, as well as of the size of presented base rates and induced estimation errors. 
Debriefing revealed that participants were not aware of their biased belief updating. 
More specifically, none of the participants were aware that the difference in updating after 
desirable and undesirable information matters for the research question and that they 
generated such a difference in their own updating. This indicates that the optimism bias in 
belief updating represents a covert and unintentional influence on judgments. This 
spontaneous dismissal of negative information calling for unfavorable belief adjustments 
constitutes a possible mechanism for maintaining optimism in the face of challenging new 
evidence (Hughes and Zaki, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011), which is particularly important when 
beliefs are self-relevant. 
Finally, behavioral results showed that the update behavior was modulated by trait 
optimism. Only highly trait-optimistic participants, but not those scoring low on trait 
optimism, showed the self-protective update pattern that selectively neglects undesirable self-
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referential information, without at the same time exhibiting such a bias for other-related 
judgments. Along with the cross-correlations between trait optimism, self-reported depression 
symptoms, and biased updating, these results support the view that optimistic distortions in 
judgment formation are related to affective states and to general expectations towards the 
future. However, there was no significant correlation between trait optimism and the initial 
tendency to estimate one‟s own risks for adverse events to be lower than those of similar 
others (i.e., before being provided with base rates, 1
st
Eself_other), in good accordance with the 
literature referring to „comparative optimism‟ (Shepperd et al., 2002). 
The primary aim of the fMRI data analyses was to provide empirical support for the 
assumed motivational causes of the optimism bias. Such motivational explanations relate to 
the assumed pleasure of favorable self-referential prospective thinking, and to decision 
processes guided by these desired end-states of judgments (D'Argembeau et al., 2009; Hughes 
and Zaki, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011; Shepperd et al., 2002). In contrast to previous research 
launching the present paradigm (Sharot et al., 2011), we focused on the neural correlates of 
updates, and not on those of estimation errors, because updates are expected to reflect the 
subjective value of the adjusted expectation towards the future more closely than estimation 
errors. For completeness, we report and discuss replications of previous results relating to 
estimation errors (Sharot et al., 2011) in the Supplementary Material (S.4, S.8 and S.10). 
Importantly, we could show that the effects in the vmPFC and the vStr represent unique 
update-dependent variance in the BOLD signal, which is different from the one relating to 
estimation errors, or base rates.  
In the following, we discuss the neural correlates of updates during the second 
estimation and during the reception of base rates, respectively. While it is not possible to 
precisely determine the point of updating during the period from the presentation of the base 
rates up to the response indicating the final estimate, we roughly assume that the presentation 
of base rates represents an early and preliminary stage of the judgment formation process, 
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while the phase immediately before the response indicating the second estimate represents the 
final decision. 
4.1 Neural correlates of updates during the second estimation 
The differential subjective value of self-referential belief updates at the time point of 
the final update decision was reflected by the activity in the subgenual vmPFC: The BOLD 
response increased both with increasing favorable and with decreasing unfavorable updates. 
In other words, both large favorable belief updates, and small unfavorable belief updates (or 
refraining from updating) were associated with increased activity in the vmPFC. Critically, 
this activation pattern was not present during judgments regarding similar others, and the 
interaction term confirmed that it was specific for judgments concerning oneself (however at a 
more liberal threshold, see 3.2). Note that for both favorable and unfavorable updating, the 
size of updates represents the adjustment of the first estimate towards the presented base rate, 
which in both conditions results (mostly) in positive signed values (i.e., after positive/lower 
base rates, a lower second estimate was expected, thus update was computed as first estimate 
– second estimate, and vice versa). From the point of view of the judging subject, both large 
belief updates towards smaller risks, and small or zero belief updates towards higher risks 
have a positive value. Thus, the vmPFC reflected the particularly salient subjective value of 
belief updates relating to one‟s own future risks. 
While the vmPFC has been shown to play a central role in representing the subjective 
value of emotional stimuli and rewards (Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Ochsner et al., 2012; 
Winecoff et al., 2013), it also has been associated with other cognitive functions, for instance 
with encoding of personal significance (D'Argembeau, 2013; Kim and Johnson, 2015). 
Nevertheless, two reasons speak for the interpretation implying the representation of values. 
First, our findings are highly specific: the activity in the vmPFC increased with increasing 
favorable updates, and decreased with increasing unfavorable updates. Explanations relating 
to personal significance cannot account for these conversely directed results because 
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increasing sizes of both favorable and unfavorable updates should be of similar personal 
significance. Second, favorable belief updating recruited specifically the subgenual region of 
the vmPFC (also termed subgenual or subcallosal cingulate), which exactly overlaps with the 
only correlate of expected value reported by the most recent meta-analysis of human 
neuroimaging studies using reinforcement learning models (Chase et al., 2015, peak 
coordinates 4/ 34/ -6; see also Levy and Glimcher, 2012). In addition, probabilistic 
frameworks using large-scale mappings between human neural and cognitive states confirm 
that the subgenual vmPFC is selectively, and not just consistently associated with the term 
„value‟ (http://www.neurosynth.org, z-score of the reverse inference map at -6/ 36/ -6 = 5.41; 
Yarkoni et al., 2011). Therefore, it can be argued that the differential engagement of the 
subgenual vmPFC supports the notion that favorable beliefs are associated with pleasure and 
emotional benefits, comparable to rewards.
Recently, the subgenual vmPFC has been related to motivational influences on self-
referential cognition beyond the general representation of positive values and rewards. At the 
between-subject level, trait optimism scores correlated with the differential activity in the 
vmPFC while imagining self-referential positive future events relative to negative ones 
(Sharot et al., 2007). The vmPFC was also recruited by processing positive personality traits 
relative to negative ones (Beer and Hughes, 2010), particularly when they were regarded as 
self-descriptive relative to non-descriptive (Moran et al., 2006), or were ascribed to close vs. 
non-close others (Hughes and Beer, 2012). However, while these studies on self-enhancing 
processing were always compounded with the general effect of valence of stimuli (e.g., 
positive vs. negative traits or events), our study is the first to demonstrate that the subgenual 
vmPFC tracks the affective meaning of judgments, independently of the valence of judged 
stimuli. The subjective value in the present task is defined by trial-to-trial fluctuations of 
belief updating, which were always related to risks of experiencing negative future events. In 
such an overall negative context of reasoning, the subjective value of the final belief is 
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computed relative to the avoided, relatively worst alternative. In accordance with this, a 
computational modeling study recently demonstrated that successful avoidance of options 
associated with a high probability of punishment (75% probability of losing 0.5€) in favor of 
options associated with a lower risk of punishment (25% probability of loss) can acquire a 
positive value, although the chosen and the avoided options are both not rewarding per se 
(Palminteri et al., 2015). Similarly, in the context of stimuli with positive and negative 
valences, the vmPFC activity correlated with personal, self-reported ratings rather than with 
objective stimulus characteristics (Winecoff et al., 2013). Thus, the subgenual vmPFC seems 
to be involved in internal computation of values of beliefs, even in the absence of the actual 
satisfying (future) event outcome, and irrespective of the presence of rewarding stimuli per se 
(Leary, 2007). In turn, such internally modulated subjective values may play a critical role in 
emotion regulation and positively biased judgment formation (Ochsner et al., 2012).  
Additional – yet indirect – support for the specific role of the subgenual vmPFC in 
motivated cognition during self-referential judgments comes from depression research. 
Particularly the subgenual vmPFC shows critical dysfunctions in patients with major 
depression, and is the target region of deep brain stimulation in treatment-resistant patients 
(Holtzheimer et al., 2012; Lozano et al., 2008). At the same time, depression has been 
associated with decreased optimism bias in belief updating (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 
2014), and impaired emotion regulation (Joormann and Quinn, 2014). Thus, adaptive 
interactions between the mood state, belief formation, and reward and emotional reactivity 
seem to critically depend on the dense neural connections crossing the subgenual vmPFC. 
At the time of the final update decision, additional brain regions in which the activity 
inversely correlated with the size of updates were revealed. Because these findings are not 
directly related to our research question, we do not discuss them in detail. 
4.2 Neural correlates of updates during the reception of base rates 
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Our second analysis of the fMRI data focused on the correlation between updates and 
the BOLD signal during the base rate presentation. This analysis aimed to explore which 
neural activity predicts the size of the subsequent estimate adjustment at the moment of being 
confronted with the disproving information. For self-related judgments and undesirable base 
rates there was an inverse correlation between the subsequent update size and the activity in a 
network of regions including the thalamus, the fusiform gyrus extending into the 
hippocampus, early visual regions, the vStr and the dmPFC. In other words, the more 
participants recruited this network while being confronted with self-related undesirable base 
rates, the less they subsequently updated their initial estimate. A direct comparison confirmed 
that the effect was specific for judgments relating to oneself relative to those about others 
(however at a more liberal threshold, see 3.2). Consequently, this network may play a crucial 
role in dismissing the relevance of self-relevant unfavorable information in the early stage of 
the judgment formation process. 
However, the exact cognitive processes involved in suppressing belief updates in 
response to undesirable information cannot be deducted from our data, as we did not assess 
specific thoughts or judgment criteria of the participants. Based on theoretical frameworks of 
comparative thinking (Mussweiler, 2003) and prior findings regarding the selection of the 
“average target” (Shepperd et al., 2002) we can make some suggestions regarding possible 
interpretations of the predictive coding of unfavorable updates. Possibly, personal 
characteristics (e.g., family history, life style and precautionary intentions) are selectively 
recalled in a way to support a relatively decreased personal risk compared to the average 
person. For instance, when confronted with an unexpectedly high base rate for a disease, one 
could recall one‟s own healthy life style that contrasts the overall unhealthy life style of the 
“average person” to promote the conclusion that high risks do not need to be applied to one 
self. This speculation is in good accordance with the known functional roles of the recruited 
network. The hippocampus (Wimmer and Shohamy, 2012) and the dmPFC (Spreng and 
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Grady, 2010; Spreng et al., 2009) are associated with mnestic, inferential and prospective 
processing necessary for case specific reasoning. Furthermore, the vStr and the thalamus play 
an important role in reward learning, which suggests that their involvement may reflect the 
adjustment of the information processing in line with the anticipated value of the ensuing 
belief updates (Galvan et al., 2005). 
The predictive engagement of the vStr in the early stage of judgment formation and 
that of the vmPFC in its final phase fit well with the differential functions suggested for these 
core components of the neural reward circuitry. While the vStr has been related to prediction 
errors and to formation of preferences early after the confrontation with the target stimulus, 
the vmPFC has reflected the conceptual, abstract value of outcomes (Chase et al., 2015; Kim 
et al., 2007; O'Doherty, 2004; Roy et al., 2012). Thus, in order to dismiss information calling 
for unfavorable future outlooks, vStr may provide rapid signals that are able to interact with 
and influence other cognitive processes in order to achieve more valuable subsequent decision 
outcomes (Kim et al., 2007). In addition, the previous demonstration that such coding of 
initial preferences by the vStr occurs automatically, i.e., even in the absence of the explicit 
instruction to evaluate the value of a stimulus (Kim et al., 2007), is consistent with the fact 
that participants in our study were not aware of their selective neglect of undesirable, self-
relevant base rates during their belief updating.  
In contrast to self-relevant judgment formation, undesirable information relevant for 
judgments about others engaged a network adjacent to the white matter with significant but 
weak inverse correlations with subsequent updates. 
5 Limitations 
While we found significantly different behavioral patterns of belief updating between 
subsamples with high and low trait optimism, comparing these subsamples with respect to 
their neural correlates did not reveal significant differences (with one exception, contrast 
self_p, inverse correlation, see Table 3A). This indicates that the described neural responses 
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to updates varying in size and desirability represent a common feature of processing self-
referential information, independent of inter-individual differences in general expectations 
towards the future. Another possible explanation is that non-significant results may be related 
to the inflated type II error due to the small subsample sizes recruited in our study. In addition 
to this general problem, the low variance of trait optimism may also explain the lack of 
significant differences in the neural correlates. However, recruiting participants with low trait 
optimism and negative self-views might require a systematic search because about 70% of the 
general population tend to have positive self-views (Swann and Jennifer, 2010). 
Two other limitations of the present study relate to the estimation errors. First, our 
algorithm for manipulation of estimation errors could not achieve perfectly balanced errors 
between the conditions because mean positive estimation errors were lower than the negative 
ones (for more details see also S.1). While the range of the manipulated errors was still better 
controlled than if we had taken true and fixed base rates, the algorithm should be improved to 
enable fully balanced error computation. Critically, the interpretation of our behavioral results 
in terms of an optimistic bias is not questioned by this imbalance, because formal learning 
models predict that the updating should be greater the bigger the estimation error. Although in 
positive trials estimation errors were on average smaller, the mean belief updating was 
significantly larger. Consequently, the smaller estimation errors in positive trials indicate that 
the optimism bias may even be underestimated to some extent. 
The second limitation relates to the imprecise assessment of subjectively experienced 
estimation errors (see also SI2 and Kuzmanovic et al., 2015). While formally the estimation 
error corresponds to the difference between participants‟ first estimate and the presented base 
rate in each trial of the experiment, the participants may not perceive this difference as an 
indication that their initial judgment was erroneous because of personal vulnerabilities or 
resources. For instance, a strong family history of cancer may suggest a higher personal risk 
of suffering from cancer relative to the population base rate, so that a presentation of a lower 
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population base rate need not be perceived as an error. In order to further improve the 
methodological precision of the paradigm, subjective estimation errors should be more 
carefully assessed. 
6 Conclusion 
Different ways of assessing the optimism bias exist, yet little is known about the 
underlying psychological processes and neural mechanisms. Our findings suggest that 
particularly when making judgments regarding one‟s own future and being confronted with 
undesirable information that calls for belief adjustments towards unfavorable future outlooks, 
a network including the vStr, the thalamus, the hippocampus, and the dmPFC is activated in 
order to prevent detrimental updating. More specifically, the more these regions associated 
with reward-based learning and complex cognitive processing (including memory retrieval, 
mental visual emulation and inferential reasoning) were activated, the smaller the subsequent 
unfavorable update. During the final computation of self-related belief updates, the positive 
value of these salient decisions was mirrored by the subgenual vmPFC: Both large belief 
updates towards better future outcomes, and refraining from updates that would have led to 
worse future outcomes have a positive subjective value and were accompanied by an 
increased activity. The fact that central nodes of the neural reward circuitry were recruited 
dependent on the valence of self-referential judgments provides empirical evidence that 
cognitive and motivational processes are closely intertwined in optimistic distortions in 
reasoning. Our findings support the conclusion that the human cognitive system is 
motivationally predisposed to dismiss undesirable information and attend to desirable 
information due to the emotional value of the so achieved optimistic judgment outcomes. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Effects of target person and valence of new information on update behavior in the overall 
sample and in the sub-samples with low and high trait optimism 
Source M SD F p r 
All participants (n = 24) 
Target: self/other 5.38/6.90 1.49/2.02 20.42 .000 .69 
Valence: p/n 7.14/5.27 1.70/2.19 17.50 .000 .67 
Group: low_to/high_to 5.79/6.67 1.53/1.66 2.19 .153 .30 
Target × valence   7.98 .010  
Group × target    0.12 .737  
Group × valence   2.00 .171  
Group × target × valence   17.25 .001  
Pairwise comparisons      
Self_p/self_n 6.79/4.24 2.14/2.03 24.62 .000 .73 
Other_p/other_n 7.50/6.26 1.92/2.80 5.27 .032 .44 
Low trait optimism (n = 13) 
Target: self/other 5.09/6.43 1.56/1.78 12.39 .004 .71 
Valence: p/n 6.50/5.11 1.57/2.19 4.41 .058 .52 
Target × valence   0.91 .360  
Pairwise comparisons      
Self_p/self_n 5.63/4.63 1.92/2.27 1.68 .219 .35 
Other_p/other_n 7.19/5.62 1.64/2.47 7.54 .018 .62 
High trait optimism (n = 11) 
Target: self/other 5.73/7.45 1.39/2.23 8.53 .015 .66 
Valence: p/n 7.91/5.45 1.59/2.29 13.63 .004 .74 
Target × valence   15.40 .003  
Pairwise comparisons      
Self_p/self_n 8.15/3.77 1.51/1.69 35.13 .000 .87 
Other_p/other_n 7.87/7.02 2.22/3.08 0.84 .382 .27 
Note: In order, dfs for the three reported samples were 1, 22; 1, 12 and 1, 10. The overall 
sample was divided into a low and a high trait optimism sub-sample based on the median Life 
Orientation Test score (17). P and n, positive and negative valence of base rates, respectively.  
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics of optimism bias measures and questionnaire scores in the overall 
sample and in the sub-samples with low and high trait optimism 
 All participants (n = 24) Low trait optimism (n = 13) High trait optimism (n = 11) 
 Min/Max M (SD) Min/Max M (SD) Min/Max M (SD) 
Biasself* -4.54/8.00 2.55 (3.11) -4,54/5.03 0.70 (2.69) -0.31/8.00 4.20 (0.79) 
Biasother -3.87/4.47 1.24 (2.54) -1.86/3.81 1.47 (2.12) -3.87/4.47 0.51 (3.01) 
Biasself_other* -2.91/8.54 1.31 (3.26) -2.91/4.44 -0.77 (2.11) -1,52/8.54 3.69 (3.09) 
1stEself_other -19.67/2.45 -7.29 (5.86) -19.67/2.45 7.29 (6.53) -17.23/0.37 7.29 (5.27) 
LOT-R* 8/22 17.00 (3.60) 8/17 14.33 (2.90) 18/22 20.10 (1.45) 
BDI* 0/11 3.88 (3.14) 1/11 5.58 (3.09) 0/5 1.70 (0.65) 
Biasself = mean updates after desirable information – mean updates after undesirable 
information, in self-trials; Biasother = mean updates after desirable information – mean updates 
after undesirable information, in other-trials; Biasself_other = biasself – biasother; 1stEself_other, 1
st
 
estimateself – 1
st
 estimateother; LOT-R, Life Orientation Test, assessing trait optimism on a 
scale from 0 (pessimistic) to 24 (optimistic); BDI, Beck Depression Inventory, assessing 
symptoms of depression on a scale from 0 (minimal) to 63 (maximal). The overall sample was 
divided into a low and a high trait optimism sub-sample based on the median LOT-R score. * 
p < .01 for t-tests testing for differences between the sub-samples with low and high trait 
optimism.  
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Table 3 
Brain regions in which the activity correlated with the size of updates: A) during the updating 
and B) during the base rate presentation 
Cluster 
level 
Voxel level Subsample comparisons 
Size Anatomical label 
†
 
 
p 
FWE-corr 
t x y z 
ß 
low_to 
ß 
high_to 
t p 
A) Activity during 2
nd
 estimation  
correlating with the size of updates 
        
 self_p > self_n           
38 vmPFC M .001 5.73 -6 34 -6 0.11 0.09 0.34 .739 
 self_p,  
inverse correlation 
          
3424 Calcarine gyrus (V1/V2) L .000 7.24 -4 -76 6 -0.21 -0.15 -0.85 .406 
Calcarine gyrus R .000 6.87 8 -78 4 -0.21 -0.09 -1.68 .107 
563 TPJ L .000 6.63 -56 -40 28 -0.20 -0.10 -1.30 .206 
294 R. operculum L .000 6.19 -44 -12 18 -0.13 -0.04 -2.52 .019 
Insula L .000 6.05 -36 -2 10 -0.13 -0.03 -1.76 .093 
23 STS L .006 5.33 -52 -54 8 -0.09 -0.07 -0.27 .791 
17 IPL (Area 2) L .014 5.13 -48 -26 42 -0.11 -0.08 -0.43 .675 
 self_n,  
inverse correlation 
          
5240 Calcarine gyrus (V1/V2) R .000 7.93 14 -84 10 -0.28 -0.18 -0.96 .348 
Calcarine gyrus L .000 7.38 -16 -70 8 -0.19 -0.18 -0.12 .909 
16 Middle temporal gyrus R .003 5.45 52 -34 -6 -0.16 -0.09 -1.26 .221 
13 Middle occipital gyrus L .006 5.34 -40 -80 12 -0.12 -0.05 -0.77 .448 
10 Middle temporal gyrus L .021 5.03 -60 -58 18 -0.21 -0.16 -0.78 .447 
 other_p,  
inverse correlation 
          
3713 Calcarine gyrus (V1/V2) L .000 7.35 -6 -74 6 -0.19 -0.18 -0.24 .813 
Calcarine gyrus R .000 6.96 8 -82 10 -0.21 -0.23 0.24 .812 
67 Supramarginal gyrus L .001 5.78 -64 -22 26 -0.15 -0.10 -0.64 .526 
83 STS L .001 5.64 -58 -52 10 -0.10 -0.18 1.01 .324 
20 Insula R .002 5.60 36 6 10 -0.12 -0.08 -0.70 .491 
90 TPJ L .003 5.48 -54 -38 32 -0.10 -0.11 0.23 .820 
24 Superior temporal gyrus R .006 5.33 60 -38 18 -0.11 -0.15 0.66 .515 
 other_n,  
inverse correlation 
          
2225 SOG (V1/V2) R .000 6.60 16 -92 18 -0.16 -0.26 1.12 .273 
Calcarine gyrus R .000 6.42 8 -70 18 -0.09 -0.19 1.07 .296 
Calcarine gyrus L .000 6.37 -8 -78 22 -0.08 -0.19 1.54 .137 
29 Lingual gyrus R .001 5.69 26 -46 -8 -0.07 -0.07 0.12 .904 
26 TPJ L .003 5.51 -52 -38 16 -0.08 -0.07 -0.20 .846 
24 Fusiform gyrus R .003 5.45 28 -62 -10 -0.05 -0.09 0.96 .347 
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B) Activity during base rate presentation 
correlating with the size of updates 
        
 self_n,  
inverse correlation 
          
72 Thalamus M .000 5.87 4 -18 14 -0.15 -0.19 0.53 .604 
18 Fusiform gyrus R .001 5.64 28 -46 -12 -0.07 -0.08 0.24 .814 
 Parahipp. gyrus R .002 5.55 26 -38 -10 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 .940 
24 Calcarine gyrus (V1) L .003 5.45 -12 -98 -2 -0.17 -0.26 0.57 .575 
22 Lingual gyrus (V4) L .004 5.40 -24 -66 -6 -0.11 -0.09 -0.25 .807 
13 vStr R .005 5.37 14 6 -4 -0.06 -0.12 1.04 .310 
15 dmPFC M .019 5.07 4 66 10 -0.15 -0.30 1.01 .322 
 other_p,  
inverse correlation 
          
119 Middle frontal gyrus R ,000 6.41 22 12 34 -0.03 -0.04 0.92 .370 
14 Inferior temporal gyrus L ,001 5.63 -40 -22 -12 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 .968 
16 Insula L ,003 5.48 -30 -4 12 -0.05 -0.04 -0.42 .679 
 other_n           
52 Middle frontal gyrus L ,004 5.42 -26 6 52 -0.01 0.14 -1.55 .135 
†
 Anatomical labels and assignments to functional areas (only reported when relating to more 
than 20% of the cluster) refer to the Anatomy toolbox. Area 2, primary somatosensory cortex; 
IPL, inferior parietal lobule; Parahipp., parahippocampal; R. operculum, Rolandic operculum; 
SOG, superior occipital gyrus; STS, superior temporal sulcus; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; 
L, left, R, right, M, medial. Coordinates refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute space. 
Subsample comparisons were based on mean beta values (ß) extracted from listed local 
maxima; low_to, subsample scoring low on trait optimism, n = 13; high_to, subsample 
scoring high on trait optimism, n = 11; self_p, self-related judgments and positive base rates; 
self_n, self-related judgments and negative base rates; other_p, other-related judgments and 
positive base rates; other_n, other-related judgments and negative base rates. There were no 
significant results for the following contrasts: 1) Activity during 2
nd
 estimation correlating 
with the size of updates: positive correlations for self_p, self_n, other_p, other_n, self_n > 
self_p, other_p > other_n, other_n > other_p, interaction effects; 2) Activity during base rate 
presentation correlating with the size of updates: positive correlations for self_p, self_n, 
other_p, negative correlations for self_p, other_n, self_p > self_n, self_n > self_p, other_p > 
other_n, other_n > other_p, interaction effects. 
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Highlights 
 
Updates of beliefs about one’s own future are optimistically biased 
Positive values of updates are tracked by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
Activity in the ventral striatum predicts the neglect of undesirable information 
Neural reward circuitry is involved in optimistically biased judgment formation 
Results support motivational explanations of the self-related optimism bias 
